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Abstract 
The debt position of the state governments in India, which deteriorated sharply between 1997-98 and 
2003-04, has witnessed significant improvement since 2004-05. Debt sustainability analysis based on 
empirical estimation of inter-temporal budget constraint and fiscal policy response function in a 
panel data framework, covering 20 Indian states for the period 1980-81 to 2015-16, indicates that the 
debt position at the state level is sustainable in the long run. The increase in contingent liabilities of 
states and take-over of large chunk of these liabilities through debt restructuring of State Power 
Distribution Companies, however, would adversely affect the debt position of states.  
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I. Introduction 
In line with an overall decentralizing trend, the sub-national governments worldwide 
have been entrusted with increasing responsibilities towards delivery of public goods and 
services, and investment in physical and social infrastructure. As the concomitant expenditure 
requirements generally fall short of own revenue receipts and inter-governmental transfers 
from the national authorities, the sub-national governments have to depend on borrowed 
resources to finance such expenditure. However, the borrowing limits of sub-national 
governments in various countries are subject to either regulatory restrictions or self-imposed 
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fiscal discipline, given the underlying requirement to ensure debt sustainability at the sub-
national level.   
 
In India, the state governments have been playing an important role in discharging 
various functions assigned to them under the Constitution. As the non-debt receipts of states 
are often not sufficient to provide the requisite financial resources, they resort to borrowings 
to meet various development needs. It is often said that borrowing per se is not bad provided 
it is used for productive purposes. While this may be a desirable goal, the actual utilisation of 
borrowed resources may not necessarily be only for productive purposes due to various 
reasons. However, the accumulation of debt liabilities, if left uncontrolled, could cause 
macroeconomic and financial stability issues.  
The evolution of debt position of state governments in India has seen several phases: a 
comfortable position prior to 1997-98 to a phase of sharp deterioration and fiscal stress 
during 1997-98 to 2003-04 and then to a phase of significant improvement since 2004-05. 
While the debt liabilities of states increased sharply during 1997-98 to 2003-04, the 
subsequent period has been a phase of consolidation, attributable, among others, to the 
implementation of fiscal rules through the enactment of Fiscal Responsibility and Budget 
Management (FRBM) Acts /Fiscal Responsibility Legislations (FRLs) at the state level in 
early 2000s. These fiscal consolidation initiatives were complemented by debt and interest 
relief measures of the Central government, and also supported by a favourable 
macroeconomic environment following the high growth phase and a reversal of the interest 
rate cycle in the mid-2000s. Majority of the states adhered to the debt targets set for them by 
the Thirteenth Finance Commission (FC-XIII) for the period 2010-2014, even as some of 
them breached their respective debt targets and continued to have unsustainable debt 
positions. In the recent period, the signs of fiscal stress have re-emerged on the back of poor 
performance of state public sector enterprises. With several states assuming additional debt 
liabilities as part of financial and operational restructuring of state power distribution 
companies, there is an inherent risk in terms of debt servicing capacity and soundness of 
fiscal performance parameters of states.  
It is against the above backdrop that this paper assesses the issue of debt sustainability 
of states in India. The debt-sustainability analysis carried out in this paper is based on three 
approaches: indicator-based analysis, estimation of both inter-temporal budget constraint and 
fiscal policy response function (to deterioration in debt position) at the state level. While the 
debt sustainability analysis per se is in respect of debt stock or outstanding liabilities of the 
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state governments, this has been extended to highlight the fiscal implications of off-budget 
items, viz., contingent liabilities of states, guarantees extended by them to state power utilities 
and finally the take-over of debt liabilities of these utilities by the state governments that have 
decided to participate in the restructuring scheme implemented by the Central government.  
     The paper is organised as follows. Section II defines debt sustainability. Section III 
presents a brief overview of various studies that have examined debt sustainability at the state 
level in the Indian context. An analytical presentation of the theoretical basis underlying  
fiscal/debt sustainability analysis is provided in Section IV. Some stylised facts relating to the 
evolution of state government debt in India are presented in Section V. Section VI presents an 
empirical assessment of debt sustainability at the state level based on different approaches.  
The rationale for extending the conventional debt sustainability analysis to include off-budget 
fiscal position of states in the context of additional debt liabilities which have arisen on 
account of take-over of debt of state power utilities is explained in Section VII. The 
concluding observations are covered in Section VIII. 
II. Defining Debt Sustainability 
Sustainability is a term that has been used with increasing frequency in the academic 
literature and multilateral policy discussions, but with different connotations under different 
circumstances (Balassone and Franco, 2000; Chalk and Hemming, 2000). How one defines 
debt sustainability could affect the conclusion one arrives about the sustainability or 
otherwise of debt in an economy. In the pioneering work on debt sustainability, based on the 
post-Second World War US data, Domar (1944) pointed out that primary deficit path can be 
sustained as long as real growth of the economy remains higher than the real interest rate. 
Buiter (1985) suggested that sustainable fiscal policy is one that is capable of keeping the 
public sector net worth to output ratio at its current level. Blanchard (1990) provided two 
conditions for sustainability viz., a) the ratio of debt to GNP should eventually converge back 
to its initial level, and b) the present discounted value of the ratio of primary surpluses to 
GNP should be equal to the current level of debt to GNP. Buiter (1985), Blanchard (1990), 
and Blanchard and others (1990) considered debt level as sustainable if a country’s debt to 
GDP ratio remains stable, and if the economy generates debt stabilising primary balance to 
cover that debt in future.  
In terms of the standard definition of fiscal sustainability, the ratio of outstanding debt 
and debt servicing to GDP, in a steady state, should not increase over time (World Bank and 
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IMF, 2010). The focus in this approach is on stabilising the debt-to-GDP ratio. IMF (2011) 
considers a set of fiscal policies as sustainable in case a borrower is able to continue servicing 
its debt without an unrealistic large future correction to its income and expenditure.  
Typically, conventional debt sustainability analysis is an accounting-based approach 
linked to the inter-temporal budget constraint as follows: 
                     Bt+1 = (1+r) Bt -PSt, ------  (1) 
which states that public debt at the beginning of the period t+1 i.e., (Bt+1) equals past period 
debt including interest payments but adjusted for primary balance, depending on whether 
there is primary surplus or deficit.  Recursively solving (1) with time period (t) starting at 0 
and extending up to infinity, we get 
                                                                t                                   
B0 
= Lim   ∑    PSt /(1+r)
t  +Lim Bt/(1+r)
t  ----- (2) 
                                                                                   t→∞      1                                                t→∞ 
Fiscal policy is said to be sustainable, if the initial stock of debt is equal to the sum of 
present discounted value of primary surpluses. Alternatively, the present value of revenues 
must be equal to the present value of spending including interest on the public debt plus 
repayment of the debt itself. This is defined as the inter-temporal budget constraint and is 
satisfied if the discounted sum of end-period debt converges to zero, i.e.,  Lim bt/(1+r)
t 
becomes 0. This transversality condition rules out a ‘Ponzi’ scheme and requires that debt 
should not grow at a rate faster than interest rate. The solvency condition for government debt 
implies that future budget surpluses would be sufficient to meet current debt liabilities. 
The transversality condition relating to the long-term solvency of public debt, when 
expressed in terms of GDP ratio, states that the GDP growth rate has to be lower than the 
interest rate so that the discounted terminal period debt ratio converges to zero. This implies 
that in case of a positive initial public debt, the sum of the cumulated discounted future public 
surpluses should exceed the sum of the cumulated discounted future public deficits. However, 
if the rate of growth of GDP is higher than the interest rate, there would be reverse stabilising 
effect on the ratio of debt to GDP even if a sub-national government is accumulating primary 
deficit. However, it may not be possible to sustain high growth situation and/or maintain the 
positive growth-interest differential for all times to come; and a positive primary balance may 
become necessary to ensure sustainability of public debt and avoid Ponzi scheme.    
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III. Review of Literature 
In the theoretical literature, the rationale for maintaining low/sustainable level of debt 
is attributed, among others, to the need to ensure sustainability of fiscal policy, provide fiscal 
space for undertaking counter-cyclical policy, absorbing contingent liabilities without 
threatening debt sustainability, reduce vulnerability to crises and optimize growth by 
reducing the risk of crowding out of private investment, while taking into account concerns 
relating to inter-generational equity and future spending needs.  In the Indian context, there 
are several empirical studies, which have examined fiscal/debt sustainability of states (Table 
1). 
Table 1: Review of Literature- Empirical Studies on Fiscal/Debt Sustainability in India 
Author of the 
Study 
Time period 
covered 
Issue covered Results of the Study 
1 2 3 4 
Dasgupta et al. 
(2012) 
2003-12 Debt 
sustainability 
of six state 
governments  
Reduction in debt-GSDP ratios of all the states 
during 2003-12, reflecting their adherence to FRBM 
Acts.  
Makin and 
Arora (2012) 
1990-91 to 
2009-10 
Fiscal 
sustainability 
at the state 
level 
While majority of the states have stabilised public 
debt levels as a proportion of GSDP, the slowdown in 
economic growth could expose many Indian states to 
considerable fiscal risk. 
Misra and 
Khundrakpam 
(2009) 
1991-92 to 
2007-08 
Debt 
sustainability 
of state 
governments 
The liabilities of state governments, based on the 
Present Value of Budget Constraint, were found to be 
unsustainable. 
Nayak and Rath 
(2009) 
1991-2009 Debt 
sustainability 
of special 
category states 
The Domar’s sustainability condition i.e., real growth 
should be higher than the real interest rate was 
achieved in all the states except Arunachal Pradesh, 
while the solvency condition was satisfied only in the 
case of Assam.  
Rajaraman et 
al.(2005) 
1992-2003 Debt 
sustainability 
at state level 
Sharp rise in debt of major states during the 
quinquennium 1997-02 over the average for the 
quinquennium 1992-97. The interest rate on state 
debt exceeded the nominal growth rate of GSDP 
during 1997-2002. There is a need for fiscal 
correction measures and institutional reforms to 
stabilize debt as a per cent of GSDP 
Goyal, 
Khundrakpam 
and Ray (2004) 
1951 to 2000 Debt 
sustainability 
of the centre, 
states and 
general 
government 
After addressing the issue of regime shift, while 
fiscal stance of the central and state governments at 
the individual level were found to be unsustainable, it 
was weakly sustainable for the combined finances of 
centre and states. 
Dholakia et al. 
(2004) 
1988-89 to 
2003-04 
Debt 
sustainability 
Based on a uniform target of debt to GSDP ratio of 
35 per cent, it was observed that there was a debt 
problem of credit magnitude only in about half of the 
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of states 25 states covered in the study. 
Buiter and Patel 
(1992) 
1971-1989 Debt 
sustainability 
of centre, 
states and 
public sector 
undertakings 
(PSU) 
Indian public debt was found unsustainable after 
discounting by various alternative measures of 
interest rates as all the discounted debt series turned 
out to be non-stationary. 
 
 Overall, the empirical studies on debt sustainability at the state level in India indicate 
a mixed picture. While some of the studies point out that the debt position of states is 
unsustainable, others have drawn attention to the declining debt-GSDP ratios at the state level 
and attributed this improvement to the strong growth performance and the implementation of 
fiscal rules during 2003-2012. It is held that a slowdown in growth momentum could pose 
risk to the achievement of envisaged gross fiscal deficit and debt-GSDP targets under the 
medium-term scenario.  
IV. Need for Assessment of Debt Sustainability at the State level      
  Globally, sub-national governments (SNGs) have assumed importance in the wake of 
their increasing role in provision of various essential services while also catering to urban 
infrastructure requirements. In this process, their resource base has also expanded with 
growing dependence on borrowed funds. However, the borrowing limits of SNGs are, by and 
large, regulated by the upper tiers of government in countries with a federal system. In 
countries with ‘golden rules’ in place, borrowings are required to be authorised, and in some 
countries (France, Ireland and the UK), the Central government could directly restrict 
borrowings by lower levels of government. In Sweden, it is mandatory for SNGs to balance 
their budgets by year-end; in case of deficits, balance has to be restored in two years. Apart 
from the imposition of restrictions on borrowing limits, the practice of having explicit co-
ordination agreements between different government tiers have also been observed.  
  In the Indian context, the starting point of the debt sustainability exercise is to 
examine whether the state governments really face hard budget constraint?  Article 293 of the 
Indian Constitution stipulates that a state may not without the consent of the Government of 
India raise any loan if there is still outstanding any part of a loan which has been made to the 
state by the Government of India or by its predecessor Government, or in respect of which a 
guarantee has been given by the Government of India or by its predecessor Government. This 
implies that the state governments do not have unrestricted power to borrow as long as they 
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are indebted to the Centre. In addition, states are also prohibited from borrowing abroad with 
the exception of loans from multilateral financial institutions intermediated by the Central 
government.  
  In addition to the restrictions under Article 293 of the Constitution of India, the state 
governments have gone ahead with the self-imposed restrictions through the enactment of 
FRBM Acts/FRLs. The implementation of a rule-based fiscal discipline mechanism under 
these enactments since the early 2000s has been marked by a gradual move towards 
sustainability of  their fiscal and debt positions, with majority of the states achieving the FC-
XIII targets as also their self-imposed targets. However, a few states continue to face fiscal 
stress and their debt positions remain an area of concern. Furthermore, notwithstanding strict 
monitoring of overall borrowing limits and adherence to various restrictions, the state 
governments have been able to raise additional ‘off-budget’ borrowings with guarantees 
through state-controlled Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs) and/or state-owned public sector 
enterprises (SPSEs), which have in-built risks of various kinds. It is against this backdrop that 
the following Section presents the evolution of debt position of state governments beginning 
1980-81. 
V. Evolution of State Government Debt in India: Some Stylised Facts   
The fiscal position of states in India, which had remained comfortable in the first 
three decades since independence, exhibited signs of fiscal stress since the mid-1980s. The 
average debt-GDP ratio inched up slightly from 18.3 per cent during the 1980s to 20.8 per 
cent during the 1990s. The period from 1997-98 to 2003-04 was, however, marked by a sharp 
deterioration in key fiscal  indicators of states, which was reflected in an increase of around 6 
percentage points in average debt-GDP ratio to 26.8 per cent and further to a high of  31.8 per 
cent  in end-March 2004 (Chart I. a).  
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Chart I: Key Fiscal Indicators of State Governments 
  
  
Note: 1.Ratios pertaining to ‘All States’ are as percentage to GDP. 
          2. NSC and SC refer to non-special and special category states, respectively. 
 
In recognition of the need for fiscal discipline, the state governments, however, 
adopted a rule-based fiscal framework through the enactment of FRBM Acts/FRLs which 
also included stipulation of ceilings on total liabilities and in some cases on debt-service 
liabilities (Goa, Jharkhand and Odisha). Karnataka was the first state to enact its FRBM Act 
in September 2002, followed by Kerala (2003), Tamil Nadu (2003) and Punjab (2004). Other 
states also adopted these legislations to avail of the benefits under the incentive scheme 
recommended by the FC-XII. The adherence to these legislations was also supported by the 
implementation of Debt Swap Scheme from 2002-03 to 2004-05 and Debt Consolidation and 
Relief Facility from 2005-06 to 2009-10 by the Central government. These two debt 
restructuring schemes provided debt relief through debt consolidation, and reduced interest 
burden on the states. In addition, a turnaround in interest rate cycle also contributed to a 
gradual reduction in effective interest rates with debt servicing costs declining over time. 
Reflecting all these developments, the debt position of the state governments improved 
significantly in the recent period, with average debt-GDP ratio of 22.2 per cent during 2012-
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13 to 2015-16 as compared to around 31 per cent in the last decade and half. However, at a 
disaggregated level, the debt-GSDP ratio was higher than 30 per cent in Kerala, Punjab, Uttar 
Pradesh and West Bengal while it was above 25 per cent in Bihar, Goa and Rajasthan in the 
latest period (Table 2). Odisha recorded a remarkable improvement in its debt-GSDP ratio 
during the period 2004-05 to 2015-16.  
Table 2: States' Debt-GSDP/GDP ratio (Average) 
    
(in per cent) 
States (1981-82 to 
1991-92) 
(1992-93 to 
1996-97) 
(1997-98 to 
2003-04) 
(2004-05 to 
2011-12) 
(2012-13 to 
2015-16) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Andhra Pradesh * 18.8 20.6 27.3 27.7 21.4 
Bihar 42.3 53.9 56.0 43.0 25.2 
Chhattisgarh     25.5 18.5 14.5 
Goa 51.5 41.4 37.1 31.0 26.3 
Gujarat 17.6 19.9 30.6 30.3 23.9 
Haryana 18.6 18.7 24.6 20.8 21.6 
Jharkhand     23.6 25.4 23.1 
Karnataka 17.5 17.9 22.7 24.0 22.6 
Kerala 14.6 23.7 31.8 33.3 31.5 
Madhya Pradesh 27.0 27.9 29.9 33.2 22.2 
Maharashtra 14.9 15.6 23.9 25.3 19.7 
Odisha 28.3 34.4 47.5 34.2 17.6 
Punjab 25.3 32.9 41.5 38.4 32.4 
Rajasthan 25.7 25.4 37.8 37.6 27.1 
Tamil Nadu 14.0 17.4 21.9 21.9 19.6 
Uttar Pradesh 23.8 32.9 43.6 44.8 32.8 
West Bengal 19.8 23.0 36.9 45.0 35.7 
NSC States 20.7 23.3 31.2 31.3 24.5 
SC States 34.1 30.1 36.7 41.9 31.7 
All States 18.3 20.8 26.8 26.9 22.1 
* The state of Andhra Pradesh includes the liabilities of newly formed state Telangana. 
Note: 1. All Ratios pertaining to 'All States' are percentages to GDP. 
           2. All variables are in nominal terms. 
           3. NSC and SC refer to non-special and special category states, respectively. 
 Source: RBI, various reports of ‘State Finances: a Study of Budgets’ and authors’ calculations. 
  
VI. Assessment of Debt Sustainability at the State Level in India 
  In the empirical literature, there are primarily two approaches to fiscal (debt) 
sustainability. The first approach basically looks at various indicators of the sustainability of 
fiscal policy (Miller 1983, Buiter 1985, 1987, Blanchard 1990, Buiter, Corsetti and Rubini 
1993) while the second approach involves empirical evaluation or tests of government 
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solvency (Hamilton and Glavin 1987, Trehan and Walsh 1988, Bohn 1998). The empirical 
testing techniques include determination of sustainable (long-run and maximum sustainable) 
level of public debt based on a partial equilibrium framework, a model-based approach and 
signal approach to fiscal sustainability. Marini and Piergallini (2007), however, suggest an 
integration of the results from these two approaches so as to provide additional information 
on the issue of government solvency.  While indicators are said to be forward looking, tests 
are considered backward looking as they are based on historical data. It is the stability of the 
parameters of the primary surplus equation which in fact determines the usefulness of results 
derived from indicators or from tests in the assessment of the sustainability of public debt. It 
is held that “without a systematic break in policy, the predictions of tests are more reliable 
since the results of indicators are likely to reflect cyclical factors”. This paper has used both 
indicator-based approach and empirical testing techniques for an assessment of debt 
sustainability at the state level. 
VI.1:Indicator-based Assessment 
Traditionally, debt sustainability analysis, under indicator-based assessment, takes 
into account credit-worthiness indicators (nominal debt stock/own current revenue ratio; 
present value of debt service/own current revenue ratio) and liquidity indicators (debt 
service/current revenue ratio and interest payments/current revenue ratio). These indicators 
broadly enable an assessment of the ability of a State government to service its interest 
payments and repay its debt as and when they become due through current and regular 
sources of revenues excluding temporary or incidental revenues as grants or capital revenue 
resulting from sale of assets. Alternatively, debt and debt-service indicators are monitored to 
assess relationship of existing debt to different types of expenditures or as ratios to various 
fiscal balances so as to gauge sustainability of both debt and fiscal situation.  
An improvement in fiscal conditions creates fiscal space, and enhances debt 
repayment capacity, while worsening of fiscal conditions entails higher borrowings, adding to 
the debt burden. In certain situations, the improvement in debt-servicing conditions could 
also be policy-induced, as discussed in the earlier section. From an analytical point of view, 
both trends in various fiscal indicators as also characteristics of institutions matter for an 
assessment of debt sustainability at the state level. In addition, debt sustainability is also 
associated with a non-financial dimension about the capacity to plan, organise and implement 
policies, which may be both budget and debt-related.  
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An analysis based on various indicators of debt sustainability in different phases 
during the period 1981-82 to 2015-16 (Table 3) reveals that the rate of growth of debt of 
states at the aggregate level exceeded the nominal GDP growth rate during Phase I (1981-82 
to 1991-92), Phase III (1997-98 to 2003-04) and Phase V (2012-13 to 2015-16). However, 
the Domar stability condition that the real rate of interest on debt (i.e., effective interest rate 
adjusted for inflation) be lower than the real GDP growth was fulfilled in all the phases 
except in Phase III when the real rate of interest was almost equal to the real output growth. 
Here, effective interest rate represents current interest payments as a per cent of outstanding 
liabilities of state governments in the previous year. 
Both primary balance and primary revenue balance remained negative in all the 
phases, even as there was some improvement in primary revenue balance-GDP ratio in the 
last two phases. Interest payments (average), which had crossed one-fifth of revenue receipts 
(considered as a tolerable ratio of interest burden, Dholakia et al. 2004) during Phase III, 
declined to 16.5 per cent  and 11.8 per cent of revenue receipts in Phase IV and Phase V, 
respectively.  
Table 3: Fiscal Sustainability of All State Governments - Indicator-based Analysis 
Sl. 
No. Indicators 
Symbolic 
Representation 
Phase-I 
Phase 
II 
Phase 
III 
Phase 
IV 
Phase 
V 
(1981-
82 to 
1991-
92) 
(1992-
93 to 
1996-
97) 
(1997-
98 to 
2003-
04) 
(2004-
05 to 
2011-
12) 
(2012-
13 to 
2015-
16) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 Rate of growth of public debt 
(D) should be lower than rate of 
growth of nominal GDP (G) D - G < 0 2.1 -1.8 7.5 -5.1 1.4 
2 Real rate of interest (r) should 
be lower than real output 
growth (g) r - g < 0 -7.2 -6.0 0.0 -6.6 -6.3 
3 (a) Primary balance (PB) should be 
in surplus PB / GDP > 0 -1.6 -0.8 -1.6 -0.3 -1.1 
3 (b) Primary revenue balance (PRB) 
should be in surplus 
PRB / GDP > 0 -1.4 -2.5 -4.6 -2.0 -1.6 
4 (a) Revenue Receipts (RR) as a per 
cent to GDP should increase 
over time RR/ GDP ↑↑ 11.3 11.3 10.5 12.0 12.9 
4 (b) Public debt to revenue receipts 
ratio should decline over time 
D / RR ↓↓ 1.8 1.8 2.6 2.2 1.7 
5 (a)  Interest burden defined by 
interest payments (IP) as a per 
cent to GDP should decline 
over time  IP / G ↓↓ 1.2 1.8 2.4 2.0 1.5 
5 (c)  Interest payments (IP) as a per 
cent of revenue receipts (RR) 
should decline over time IP / RR ↓↓ 10.4 15.8 22.6 16.5 11.8 
Source: RBI, various reports of State Finances a Study of Budgets and authors’ calculations. 
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The trend in debt-GDP ratio of all states was influenced by the differential between 
the GDP growth and effective interest rate during the period under review (Chart II). 
 
 
A state-wise position in respect of debt sustainability indicators for 17 non-special 
category states is presented in Table 4. It may be seen that in all the states the rate of growth 
of GSDP was higher than the effective interest rate in the last two phases, even as the gap 
between the two narrowed down in Phase V (Table 4a). Furthermore, the rate of growth of 
public debt turned out to be higher than the GSDP growth in several states in Phase V, which 
is a cause of concern (Table 4b). The debt redemption pressure is also evident from the ratio 
of debt redemption (principal and interest payments) to total debt receipts, which shot up 
from 64.1 per cent during 1981-82 to 2003-04 to 79.8 per cent during 2004-05 to 2015-16. 
This is indicative of a smaller proportion of borrowed funds being available for productive 
uses by the state governments during the latter period.  
 
In addition to the debt sustainability indicators as discussed above, it may also be 
appropriate to analyse debt profile linked vulnerability indicators viz., spread on state 
government debt, average maturity and ownership pattern of debt. These indicators provide 
an idea about liquidity and pricing risks associated with the level of debt and its composition.  
From 1988-89 onwards, the weighted average yield on state government securities has been 
observed to be marginally higher than that on the Central government securities. Before this 
period, these loans were intermediated by the Central government. The ownership pattern of 
state government securities indicates a pre-dominance of commercial banks, although their 
share in total outstanding state government securities has declined steadily from 78.5 per cent 
in end-March 1991 to 61.9 per cent in end-March 2000 and further to 42.1 per cent in end-
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March 2016. The share of insurance companies has, however, increased significantly during 
the same period. As the state government securities are eligible for being counted towards 
SLR requirements of banks, investment in these securities is considered credit-risk free. 
Higher yield on these securities vis-a-vis Central government securities is another attraction 
for long-term investors. The state-specific fiscal performance related risk factors are 
presumably not being factored in by the investors.  However, this situation may not continue 
for long in case there is any deviation in the extant institutional arrangement for management 
of state government debt. 
Table 4: Indicators of Debt Sustainability 
Table 4a: Sustainability  of debt (Rate of growth of GSDP (g) should be higher than effective 
interest rate i; g-i>0) 
 State (1981-82 to 
1991-92) 
(1992-93 to 
1996-97) 
(1997-98 to 
2003-04) 
(2004-05 to 
2011-12) 
(2012-13 to 
2015-16) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Andhra Pradesh $ 8.4 6.3 -0.5 7.6 7.7 
Bihar 6.8 3.2 -0.5 9.6 12.1 
Chhattisgarh   
 
-0.6 9.8 6.9 
Goa 9.1 12.2 5.5 11.8 1.3 
Gujarat 5.6 10.8 -0.3 7.9 5.3 
Haryana 7.0 4.4 0.5 8.6 5.5 
Jharkhand   
 
-2.5 5.7 6.0 
Karnataka 7.3 6.4 -0.7 7.5 6.1 
Kerala 5.8 3.1 -1.0 5.2 5.6 
Madhya Pradesh 7.6 4.4 -0.5 7.1 11.5 
Maharashtra 6.3 9.7 -0.2 8.0 6.1 
Odisha 5.7 2.5 1.0 8.8 5.8 
Punjab 7.8 4.5 -1.4 5.5 3.9 
Rajasthan 8.1 6.6 -1.4 8.3 3.6 
Tamil Nadu 7.0 7.6 -1.4 8.8 7.8 
Uttar Pradesh 6.4 4.9 -2.0 7.2 5.5 
West Bengal 5.5 3.2 -0.1 4.6 7.0 
NSC States 6.7 7.1 -0.7 7.3 6.5 
SC States 7.5 6.9 -0.1 6.4 7.3 
All State 7.1 6.3 0.0 7.5 3.3 
$ The state of Andhra Pradesh includes newly formed state Telangana. 
 Notes: 1. All variables are in nominal terms. 
            2. NSC and SC refer to non-special and special category states, respectively. 
Source: RBI, various reports of ‘State Finances: a Study of Budgets’ and authors’ calculations. 
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Table 4b: Rate of growth of public debt (k) should be lower than growth rate of nominal 
GSDP (g); k-g<0 
 State (1981-82 to 
1991-92) 
(1992-93 to 
1996-97) 
(1997-98 to 
2003-04) 
(2004-05 to 
2011-12) 
(2012-13 to 
2015-16) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Andhra Pradesh $ 0.9 0.5 7.4 -5.2 -4.3 
Bihar 4.2 -0.9 2.1 -10.2 -4.8 
Chhattisgarh   -11.1 -0.5 -11.2 8.1 
Goa -1.1 -11.4 2.1 -7.3 3.4 
Gujarat 6.9 -8.3 10.5 -4.4 -3.0 
Haryana 1.2 -0.1 6.4 -4.6 8.0 
Jharkhand   -9.4 -6.6 2.0 2.8 
Karnataka 1.3 0.2 7.0 -2.1 0.4 
Kerala 3.9 -0.7 9.1 -1.7 0.7 
Madhya Pradesh 2.8 -1.6 3.2 -4.9 -7.5 
Maharashtra 5.2 -3.9 10.3 -4.6 -4.4 
Odisha 2.9 2.1 4.9 -11.9 -8.0 
Punjab 7.9 -0.8 6.3 -5.3 0.6 
Rajasthan -0.6 0.1 8.6 -7.6 7.6 
Tamil Nadu 3.1 -1.1 7.8 -4.7 -2.5 
Uttar Pradesh 5.5 0.3 7.8 -5.3 1.6 
West Bengal 2.4 2.3 11.4 -2.2 -6.1 
NSC States 3.7 -2.5 8.1 -5.1 -1.7 
SC States 3.8 -7.7 9.0 -4.3 -4.8 
All State 2.1 -1.8 7.5 -5.1 1.4 
$ The state of Andhra Pradesh includes newly formed state Telangana. 
Notes: 1. All variables are in nominal terms. 
            2. NSC and SC refer to non-special and special category states, respectively. 
Source: RBI, various reports of State Finances a Study of Budgets and authors’ calculations. 
 
VI.II:Econometric Framework for Assessment of Debt Sustainability at State Level 
 
The fiscal/debt sustainability exercise, in the empirical literature, is extended beyond 
the simple indicator-based assessment to validate whether inter-temporal government budget 
constraint is satisfied. This entails test of stationarity properties of the government debt stock 
(in level and first difference), examination of the long-term relationship between government 
revenues and expenditures, between primary balances and debt, and between capital 
expenditure and public debt (Bhatt, 2011). While confirmation of stationarity of government 
debt stock (in level and first difference) indicates statistical reversion towards mean value 
after temporary disturbances, the presence of cointegration between government revenues 
and expenditures reflects their co-movements and anchoring of fiscal imbalances. 
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VI.II.1 Inter-temporal Budget Constraint 
In line with the empirical literature, we have made an attempt to test whether the 
fiscal policy stance of Indian states is sustainable, i.e., whether it satisfies the inter-temporal 
budget constraint. This test basically examines whether the past behaviour of state 
governments’ revenues, expenditure and fiscal deficit could be continued indefinitely without 
prompting an adverse response from the lenders/investors from/to whom they borrow/sell 
securities to meet their resource gap.                                           
The inter-temporal budget constraint, under the assumption that the funding of interest 
payments are not made from the new debt issuances (i.e., no-Ponzi scheme), imposes 
restrictions on the time series properties of government expenditure and revenues. This 
requires that government expenditure, revenues and debt stock are all stationary in the first 
differences. The stationarity property also restricts the extent of deviation of government 
expenditure from revenues over time. In case government expenditure and revenues are I (1) 
and cointegrated, then the error correction mechanism would push government finances 
towards the levels required by the inter-temporal budget constraint and ensure fiscal and debt 
sustainability in the long term (Cashin and Olekalns 2000).  
In this section, to start with, the stationarity properties of state government debt, 
revenues and expenditure have been tested in a panel data framework. After having done the 
stationarity test, we have examined whether a long-run equilibrium exists between 
government expenditure and revenues through panel cointegration tests. 
Data 
All data on state government expenditure, revenues and outstanding level of debt have 
been taken from the ‘Handbook of Statistics of the Indian Economy’, published by the 
Reserve Bank of India. As already mentioned, the data covers the period 1980-81 to 2015-16 
for 20 Indian states. A list of the states selected for the present analysis is presented in 
Appendix I. Only those states have been selected, for which data on all the relevant variables 
are available for the entire time period. In the case of Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Madhya 
Pradesh, the data on respective fiscal variables from 2000-01 also include data relating to 
Jharkhand, Uttarakhand and Chhattisgarh, respectively. This has been done to ensure 
comparability of data for the entire period covered in the econometric exercise. The variables 
have been converted into real terms and logarithmic values of the variables have been 
considered for the analysis.   
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Unit Root Analysis 
As already mentioned, the stationarity properties of state government debt, revenues 
and expenditure are tested through panel unit root tests.  Panel unit root tests are perceived to 
be more powerful than the unit root test applied on a single series. This is because the 
information content of the individual time series gets enhanced by that contained in the cross-
section data within a panel set up (Ramirez, 2006). There are different methods to carry out 
panel-based unit root tests. While the panel unit root methodology of Levin, Lin and Chu 
(2002) assumes that there is a common unit root process across the relevant cross sections, 
the tests suggested by Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) and Maddala and Wu (1999) assume 
individual unit root processes.  
The results of panel unit root tests on relevant fiscal variables (debt, total revenues 
and total expenditure) are furnished in Table 5. It may be seen that the tests (Levin, Lin and 
Chu; Im, Pesaran and Shin; and Maddala and Wu) failed to reject the null hypothesis of a unit 
root for government revenues and expenditure in level form. The tests, however, reject the 
null of a unit root in the first difference. The government debt, on the other hand, was found 
to be stationary both in level and first difference as per the Levin, Lin and Chu and Im, 
Pesaran and Shin tests. As per the Maddala and Wu test, however, the government debt 
turned out to be stationary only in the first difference. Overall, the results reveal that the three 
variables viz., debt, total revenues and total expenditure are stationary in first difference. 
Table 5: Results of Panel Unit Root Test 
Variables (Levels) LLC  
t Statistics 
IPS  
W Statistics 
Maddala & Wu 
PP- Fisher Chi 
Square 
1 2 3 4 
States’ Debt (log B) -2.86* -2.19* 46.95 
Government Revenue (log R) 2.85 8.30 4.04 
Government Expenditure (log G) 1.63 7.90 6.39 
Variables (Differences)    
States’ Debt (D log B) -16.13* -15.79* 310.49* 
Government Revenue (D log R) -27.51* -28.52* 564.71* 
Government Expenditure (D log G) -26.06* -25.55* 577.12* 
Note: 1. LLC = Levin, Lin, Chu (2002); IPS = Im, Pesaran, Shin (2003)  
2. The statistics are asymptotically distributed as standard normal with a left hand side rejection area 
3. * indicates the rejection of the null hypothesis of non-stationarity (LLC, IPS and Maddala &  Wu) at 1 
per cent level of significance 
4. Automatic selection of lags through Schwarz Information Criteria (SIC)  
5. All panel unit root tests are defined by Bartlett kernel and Newly West bandwidth  
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Panel Cointegration 
Since log R and log G were found to be I (1), in the next step, an attempt has been 
made to test, whether there exists a long-run equilibrium (steady state) between government 
expenditure and revenues through the panel cointegration tests. Panel cointegration technique 
has an advantage over the cointegration tests for individual series as it allows to selectively 
pool information regarding common long-run relationships from across the panel while 
allowing the associated short-run dynamics and fixed effects to be heterogeneous across 
different series of the panel (Pedroni 1999). 
In this section, the methodology proposed by Pedroni (1999) has been used to test 
whether a cointegrating relationship exists between government revenues and expenditure of 
the selected Indian states under study. This method employs four panel statistics and three 
group panel statistics to test the null hypothesis of no cointegration against the alternative 
hypothesis of cointegration. In the case of panel statistics, the first-order autoregressive term 
is assumed to be the same across all the cross sections. On the other hand, in the case of 
group panel statistics, the parameter is allowed to vary over the cross sections.  The statistics 
are distributed, in the limit, as standard normal variables with a left hand rejection region, 
with the exception of variance ratio statistics. The results of the cointegration tests are 
presented in Table 6.  
 
The test results for both the panel and group statistics reveal strong evidence of panel 
cointegration. The estimated ‘rho’ statistics, variance ratio ‘V’ statistics, Augmented Dickey 
Fuller ‘t’ statistics and the Phillips and Perron (non-parametric) ‘t’ statistics reject the null 
hypothesis of no cointegration at 1 per cent level for all the three models : (i) model with no 
deterministic intercept or trend; (ii) model with individual intercept and no deterministic 
trend; and (iii) model with individual intercept and individual trend. This implies that the 
cointegration results are not affected by different modelling assumptions.  
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Table 6: Panel Cointegration Tests for Government Revenue and Expenditure  
Test Statistics Panel Statistics Group Statistics 
1 2 3 
Model with no deterministic intercept or trend 
V statistics 12.20* 
(0.00) 
 
Rho statistics -11.16* 
(0.00) 
-8.27* 
(0.00) 
PP statistics -7.76* 
(0.00) 
-8.90* 
(0.00) 
ADF statistics -7.45* 
(0.00) 
-8.50* 
(0.00) 
Model with individual intercept and no deterministic trend 
V statistics 9.43* 
(0.00) 
 
Rho statistics -9.90* 
(0.00) 
-6.87* 
(0.00) 
PP statistics -8.26* 
(0.00) 
-7.61* 
(0.00) 
ADF statistics -8.45* 
(0.00) 
-8.11* 
(0.00) 
Model with individual intercept and individual trend 
V statistics 14.46* 
(0.00) 
 
Rho statistics -6.63* 
(0.00) 
-3.83* 
(0.00) 
PP statistics -6.62* 
(0.00) 
-6.47* 
(0.00) 
ADF statistics -6.92* 
(0.00) 
-6.25* 
(0.00) 
Notes: 1. All reported values are asymptotically distributed as standard normal. 
      2. Figures in the parentheses indicate the respective p-values. 
       3. * indicates the rejection of the null hypothesis of no cointegration at 1 per cent level of significance. 
      4.  Automatic selection of lags through Schwarz Information Criteria (SIC). 
      5.  Newly West bandwidth selection using a Bartlett kernel. 
 
The results of the Pedroni test are also supported by Kao residual cointegration test, 
which rejects the null hypothesis of no cointegration at 1 per cent level (Table 7). Thus, the 
overall findings of the panel cointegration tests reveal that the two series, government 
revenues and expenditure are cointegrated, indicating a long-term co-movement between 
them. The results suggest that the current fiscal policies of Indian states are sustainable in the 
long run.  
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Table 7: Results of Kao Residual Panel Cointegration Tests 
Item t-Statistic Prob. 
1 2 3 
ADF -12.72*  0.00 
Residual variance  0.006  
HAC variance  0.004  
Notes: 1. * indicates the rejection of the null hypothesis of no cointegration at 1  
per cent level of significance. 
2. Newly West bandwidth selection using a Bartlett kernel. 
3. Automatic selection of lags through Schwarz Information Criteria. 
 
VI.II.2 Fiscal Policy Response Function 
 
Bohn (1998), Adams et al. (2010) and Tiwari (2012) have analysed the response of 
primary surplus to variations in public debt for the purpose of assessment of fiscal policy/debt 
sustainability.  In case primary surplus (relative to GDP) is observed to be a positive function 
of public debt (relative to GDP), it implies that rising debt ratios lead to higher primary 
surpluses relative to GDP, which is indicative of a tendency towards mean reversion and thus 
fiscal/debt sustainability. We have also used this approach in the following analysis. 
Model Specification 
The following equation is estimated in a panel data framework with annual data from 
1980-81 to 2015-16.  
St = α 0 + β D (t-1) + α1 GSDPGAP t + α2 EXPGAP t + ε    .......................... (2) 
 
In this equation, GSDP is the gross state domestic product; S is the primary balance to 
GSDP ratio; D is debt to GSDP ratio; GSDPGAP is the deviation of actual output from the 
trend; EXPGAP is the deviation of actual primary expenditure from the trend; ε is the error 
term. The business cycle variable GSDPGAP has been included to account for the 
fluctuations in revenues. The variable EXPGAP captures the impact of deviations of real 
primary expenditure from its long-term trend on the primary balance ratio. Here ‘β’ is the key 
coefficient, which measures the response of primary balance to debt. A value of this 
coefficient between zero and unity is consistent with a sustainable fiscal policy response to 
debt. A negative coefficient implies potentially destabilising response. In addition, allowance 
has been made in the estimations for the response of primary balance to GSDP ratio to be 
non-linear and allow it to vary with debt levels by introducing a square term of the debt to 
GSDP ratio as an additional explanatory variable.  
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Data 
As in the earlier empirical exercise, the fiscal response function has also estimated for 
20 states, for which data on all the relevant variables are available for the period 1980-81 to 
2015-16. The data for Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh from 2000-01 also include 
that relating to Jharkhand, Uttarakhand and Chhattisgarh, respectively. Outstanding liabilities 
of each state government have been used to represent the level of their debt. GSDPGAP for 
each state has been worked out by extracting the deviation in real GSDP from its trend 
through HP-Filter. The deviation is expressed as a per cent of real GSDP. EXPGAP has been 
calculated in a similar manner using real primary expenditure of the state governments. The 
pair-wise correlation coefficients between the explanatory variables were found to be 
statistically insignificant, thus ruling out any multicollinearity problem.  
Results 
Before proceeding with the estimation, all the series were tested for stationarity. 
Based on panel unit root tests involving common unit root process (LLC) as well as 
individual unit root process (IPS), the dependent variable and the explanatory variable series 
were found to be stationary, i.e., I (0). The results of the panel unit root tests are furnished in 
Table 8. 
Table 8: Results of Panel Unit Root Tests 
Variables (Levels) LLC t Statistics IPS W Statistics 
1 2 3 
States’ Debt / GSDP -2.34* -2.25* 
Primary Surplus / GSDP -7.16* -8.30* 
GSDPGAP -7.00* -11.17* 
EXPGAP -11.71* -13.29* 
Notes: 1. LLC = Levin, Lin, Chu (2002); IPS = Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003)  
2.* indicates the rejection of the null hypothesis of non-stationarity at 1 per cent 
level of significance 
3. Automatic selection of lags through Schwarz Information Criteria (SIC). 
4. All panel unit root tests are defined by Bartlett kernel and Newly West 
bandwidth  
 
 
To decide on the panel models, i.e., whether it is a fixed effect (FE) model or a 
random effect (RE) model, Hausman test was conducted for each of the two model 
specifications (linear and non-linear). The summary results of the Hausman test are furnished 
in Appendix II. The results of the Hausman test for both the models indicate that there is a 
significant difference in the coefficients estimated by the FE and RE models. Therefore, the 
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null hypothesis of correlated random effect is rejected and the alternative hypothesis that 
individual specific effect is correlated with the explanatory variables is accepted. 
Accordingly, fixed effect model has been chosen for estimating the two model specifications 
indicated above.  
The models have been estimated through generalised least square technique with 
cross section Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) with a correction for first order 
autoregressive error term. The models are adjusted for the heteroscedasticity with White 
cross-section standard errors and covariance method. The empirical results from the panel 
regression exercise are presented in Table 9. In Model 1 (linear model), the coefficients of all 
the explanatory variables were found to be significant at one per cent level. Positive 
coefficient of D indicates that the primary balance of state governments increases in response 
to rising debt ratios. This implies that the primary fiscal balance in India responds in a 
stabilising manner to increases in debt.  Positive coefficient of GSDPGAP implies that 
primary balance improves when GSDP is above the trend. The negative coefficient of 
EXPGAP, on the other hand, indicates that the primary balance declines when primary 
expenditure is above the trend. These findings are in line with a priori expectations.  
 
Table 9: Estimation Results 
Explanatory Variables Estimated Coefficients 
Model 1 (Linear) Model 2 (Non-linear) 
1 2 3 
Constant -2.78* -3.77* 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Dt-1 0.05* 0.11* 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Dt-1  2  -0.001* 
  (0.03) 
GSDPGAP 0.04* 0.04* 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
EXPGAP -0.10* -0.10* 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
AR(1) 0.50* 0.50* 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Adjusted R2 0.76 0.78 
   
DW 2.03 2.04 
Note: 1) Figures in the parentheses represent respective P values 
2) * denotes significant at 1% level 
 
In the non-linear equation approach (Model 2), allowance was made for the 
possibility that the response of the primary balance to debt is better represented in terms of a 
quadratic function rather than a linear response function. The results suggest that the primary 
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balance function has an inverted ‘u’ shape, implying that the adjustment parameter first rises 
and then falls.  
VII. Going beyond the Conventional Debt Sustainability Analysis 
In the empirical literature, several studies have gone beyond the conventional debt 
sustainability analysis in various ways. This has been done by extending the scope of 
conventional debt analysis (based on the inter-temporal budget constraint in a static 
environment) to account for fiscal and economic behaviour in response to shocks (sensitivity 
analysis), fiscal vulnerabilities (stress-testing exercise) and short-term refinancing risks. The 
interaction of key variables driving debt dynamics is also factored in debt sustainability 
exercises. There are other studies which have used a more comprehensive concept of debt, 
covering not only explicit liabilities but also contingent, implicit and off-budget liabilities 
After having examined the debt sustainability issue, based on indicator-based 
approach, inter-temporal budget constraint exercise and fiscal policy response function of 
states in the earlier sections, an attempt has been made to examine the impact of contingent 
liabilities on debt/fiscal sustainability of states in India. Article 293 (1) of the Constitution of 
India provides that a state government can give guarantees within such limits as may be fixed 
by the State legislature on the security of the Consolidated Fund of the State. Guarantees 
issued by states are considered as contingent liabilities on the Consolidated Fund of the State 
in case of default by the borrower for whom the guarantee is extended.  The state 
governments have generally been conservative in the issuance of guarantees (in respect of 
loans raised by government departments, public sector undertakings, local authorities, 
statutory boards and corporations, and co-operative institutions) and follow certain norms, 
whether stipulated under the State Government Guarantees Act or FRBM Acts/FRLs of states 
or administrative limits fixed for issuance of guarantees. Under these enactments, limits are 
fixed on annual incremental guarantees as ratio to GSDP or total revenue receipts (Appendix 
III). Apart from the differences across states in terms of guidelines relating to guarantees, 
there are also sharp differences when it comes to awareness about fiscal risk linked to 
issuance of these guarantees and the state level efforts to reduce outstanding guarantees as a 
policy initiative.  
The guarantee commitments of state governments in respect of state public sector 
enterprises (SPSEs) have recently emerged as a major source of potential risk to fiscal and 
debt sustainability at the state level. While the need for issuance of guarantees to SPSEs arose 
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after 1993-94, when the practice of allocation of a separate share in market borrowings to 
these enterprises was discontinued, it assumed further importance in the wake of declining 
budgetary support to these enterprises for meeting their capital requirements. As borrowing 
requirements of these entities increased, these were backed by issuance of guarantees in 
several states, resulting in an increase in explicit contingent liabilities of these states. This 
problem is more acute in those states, which have not enacted any law or framed any rules for 
fixing the ceiling on guarantees to be given by the state government. On the other hand, there 
are a few states (Odisha) which have exercised due precaution in putting in place rules to 
avoid the spill-over effect of these guarantees to State budgets.  
The unbridled growth in guarantees issued to SPSEs, which have large outstanding 
debt and are also incurring losses, have increased vulnerability of these enterprises with fiscal 
implications for the state governments. This is evident from the data relating to outstanding 
debt and accumulated losses/ profit of SPSEs at end March 2015 (Table 10). In some states, 
the outstanding debt of SPSEs is of much larger magnitude than outstanding guarantees 
issued to these undertakings. On top of this, many SPSEs have accumulated huge losses, 
which indicate their poor debt-servicing capacity entailing the risk of default in future.  
Table 10: Outstanding Debt, Guarantees and Accumulated Profit/Losses of State 
PSUs  in-end March 2015 
 (Amount in ` crore) 
State Outstanding Debt Outstanding 
Guarantees 
Accumulated 
Profit/Loss 
1 2 3 4 
Andhra Pradesh 52983.6 7581.34 -10812.19 
Assam 2783.52 Nil -3658.21 
Bihar 11693.27 3732.97 -3137.76 
Chhattisgarh 13602.11 744.73 -4780.58 
Gujarat 42509.05 1652.82 3721.00 
Haryana 37847.90 28746.85 -24043.86 
Himachal Pradesh 6568.11 2746.24 -2951.26 
Jammu & Kashmir 4429.09 2574.78 -2907.29 
Jharkhand 7736.75 Nil -16755.73 
Karnataka 32086.94 7251.35 731.66 
Kerala 8912.96 5579.21 -198.94 
Madhya Pradesh 37178.92 8958.90 -29597.25 
Maharashtra 54477.66 2540.30 -9071.83 
Manipur 3.05 Nil -74.74 
Meghalaya 1310.44 758.18 -576.93 
Mizoram 30.93 18.61 -58.03 
Nagaland 61.66 15.00 -49.35 
Odisha 7503.98 2001.37 2763.57 
Punjab 14597.07 49058.42 -6236.66 
Rajasthan 74747.68 90054.11 -83732.89 
Sikkim 273.25 109.50 -117.72 
Tamil Nadu 62044.08 16951.26 -38233.61 
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Telangana 50969.43 15249.51 -15343.59 
Tripura 245.56 Nil -634.48 
Uttar Pradesh 88850.29 59822.93 -94151.70 
West Bengal 23604.19 8060.49 -190.07 
Note: 1. Data relating to Odisha, Mizoram and Nagaland pertain to 2013-14 and those relating to 
Tamil Nadu to the year 2012-13.  
Source: Comptroller and Auditor General of India (CAG) 
 
A state-wise picture of outstanding liabilities and guarantee commitments including 
guarantees issued to power sector companies is given in Appendix IV. While the guarantees 
outstanding as a per cent of outstanding liabilities of all states was around 16.1 per cent in 
end March 2015, it exceeded the all-states average in eight states. Power sector’s share was 
the largest in total guarantees outstanding, with power sector in nine states having a share of 
more than 80 per cent. In fact, the fiscal risk associated with guarantees issued to power 
sector has repeatedly been experienced since the early 2000s. In 2001, the burden of clearing 
outstanding dues of state electricity boards to central public sector undertakings was taken 
over by state governments through issuance of power bonds amounting to ` 29,606 crore. 
The accumulated losses of all power distribution utilities (DISCOM) were estimated at ` 1.90 
lakh crore as on March 31, 2011 (Expert Group on Financial Health of State Distribution 
Utilities; Chairman: Shri B K Chaturvedi), requiring another financial restructuring plan 
(FRP) (October 5, 2012) involving take-over of outstanding short-term loans as of March 31, 
2012 to the extent of 50 per cent by the respective states under this plan. The accumulated 
losses of DISCOMs in the country subsequently increased to approximately `3.8 lakh crore 
as on March 31, 2015, despite the implementation of FRP in select states where the situation 
was critical. In 2015-16, the Central government announced a new Scheme viz., Ujwal 
Discom Assurance Yojana (UDAY) for the purpose of financial and operational restructuring 
of the state power distribution companies (DISCOMs).  As on January 9, 2017, 15 states2 
have already signed MoUs to take over 75 per cent of outstanding debt of their DISCOMs 
under the UDAY over a period of two years (and in some cases in five years) adding to their 
liabilities and involving additional interest expenditure over a period of ten years (Appendix 
V). Furthermore, these states are also expected to fund the future losses, if any, of DISCOMs 
in a graded manner and this liability could be as high as 50 per cent of the previous year’s 
loss in the year 2020-21.  As on January 9, 2017, the participating states have already taken 
over debt liability of DISCOMS to the tune of   ` 1.82 lakh crore, i.e., around 42 per cent of 
                                                          
2 In addition, 6 states have signed MoUs to bring about an improvement in operational efficiency of their 
DISCOMs. 
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total outstanding debt of DISCOMs, estimated at ` 4.3 lakh crore as at end-September 2015. 
It is, therefore, imperative that the underlying operational efficiency parameters3 are achieved 
within the stipulated time frame to bring about a turnaround in financial position of 
DISCOMs and to avoid state government participation in such restructuring exercises in 
future, which may assume crisis proportion.  
Majority of the states are yet to implement the recommendation of the Group of State 
Finance Secretaries on the Fiscal Risk on State Government Guarantees (2002) that 
appropriate risk weights be assigned to guarantees given by states on the basis of probability 
of devolvement of guarantees, and adequate budgetary provisions be made for honouring 
these guarantees in case they devolve on the states. The Group had in fact gone a step further 
by recommending that “guarantees in regard to liabilities which are clearly intended to be met 
out of budgetary resources should be treated as equivalent to debt.” In case, we take 
outstanding liabilities of states along with their PSUs, the position of some states turns out to 
be quite alarming on the back of accumulation of losses of PSUs in these states (Appendix 
VI).  
VIII: Conclusion 
In this paper, the debt sustainability of state governments in India was assessed 
through indicator-based analysis as well as empirical exercises. The indicator-based analysis 
revealed that while most of the debt sustainability indicators showed significant improvement 
during 2004-05 to 2015-16 compared to the earlier phase (1997-98 to 2003-04), debt 
repayment capacity and interest burden indicators lagged behind their respective performance 
levels achieved during 1981-82 to 1991-92.  
The estimation results based on a panel data framework covering 20 Indian states for 
the time period 1980-81 to 2015-16 revealed that there is a cointegrating relationship between 
government revenues and expenditure in India, which tantamount to satisfying the inter-
temporal budget constraint. Moreover, the estimated fiscal policy response function showed 
that the primary balance position of Indian states responds in a stabilising manner to the 
increases in debt. Thus, both the results indicate that the current debt situation at the state 
level is sustainable in the long run. 
                                                          
3 These include reduction of AT & C loss to 15 per cent by 2018-19; reduction in gap between average revenue 
realised and average cost of supply of power to zero by 2018-19; and almost all DISCOMs to be profitable by 
2017-18 and 3-4 by 2018-19. 
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Disaggregated level analysis, however, revealed that despite an overall improvement 
in debt position of the Indian states, some of the states have not been able to achieve their 
respective FC-XIII targets. Going forward, there are several developments with a bearing on 
debt/fiscal sustainability of states in India. First, the committed liabilities of states may 
increase in case they decide to implement the Seventh Pay Commission Award, even as some 
of them have their own pay panels. Second, the interest liabilities of states that have 
participated in financial restructuring of DISCOMs would increase besides additional 
provision to be made by them for extending financial support to these utilities in case they 
continue to incur losses in future as spelled out in MoUs signed by them. Third, the 
guarantees given to other SPSEs in some states, which are also loss-making entities, could 
also give rise to financial burden on the states. These dimensions would assume importance 
in case there is any deviation from the extant institutional arrangement for management of 
state government debt. 
Overall, the conventional debt sustainability analysis, as attempted in this paper, 
shows that debt position of states at the aggregate level is sustainable. While we have not 
analysed the implicit liabilities (linked to PPP projects and unfunded liabilities related to 
pension), our paper highlights that the explicit contingent liabilities linked to guarantees 
given by the state governments have assumed significance in the context of debt 
sustainability exercise at the state level. Given this, any debt/fiscal sustainability exercise, 
based only on outstanding liabilities of states does not provide a realistic assessment of the 
situation at the individual state level. We would like to conclude with an observation of the 
RBI Group which was set up to assess the fiscal risk of State Government Guarantees (2002) 
that 
“in order to have a norm in terms of debt sustainability the underlying guarantees can be 
mapped out and likely amount of devolvement could be estimated for future years. The total of such 
likely devolvement during the life of the guarantees could then be treated as normal debt and clubbed 
together with debt obligations. Together, the liability could be measured as a ratio of SDP to ensure 
that debt plus likely devolvement on guarantees during its life is sustainable and to ensure that 
guarantees are also captured in such measures”. 
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Appendix I: List of States 
 
1. Andhra Pradesh 
2. Assam 
3. Bihar 
4. Gujarat 
5. Haryana 
6. Himachal Pradesh 
7. Jammu & Kashmir 
8. Karnataka 
9. Kerala 
10. Maharashtra 
11. Manipur 
12. Meghalaya 
13. Madhya Pradesh 
14. Odisha 
15. Punjab 
16. Rajasthan 
17. Tamil Nadu 
18. Tripura 
19. Uttar Pradesh 
20. West Bengal 
 
Appendix II: Results of the Hausman Test for Correlated Random Effects  
 
Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
Model 1 
Cross-section random 49.43 3 0.00 
     
     
        Model 2   
 
Cross-section random  53.28 4 0.00 
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Appendix III: Limits on Guarantee Set in Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Acts* 
or other legislations of States  
State Guarantees  
Act Stipulated Limits Guarantee 
Redemption Fund 
(GRF)** 
Andhra 
Pradesh 
Andhra Pradesh 
FRBM Act, 2005 
The amount of annual incremental risk weighted guarantees 
to be limited to 90 per cent of the total revenue receipts in 
the year preceding the current year. 
GRF set up in 2002-
03 
Arunachal 
Pradesh 
Arunachal Pradesh 
FRBM Act, 2006 
 The State to be conservative in giving guarantees. GRF not yet set up 
Assam Administrative 
ceiling (2000) 
Assam FRBM Act, 
2005 
The ceiling on guarantee issued by the state government 
was fixed at ` 1,500 crore. 
Government guarantees to be restricted at any point of time 
to 50 per cent of State's own tax and non-tax revenues of 
the second preceding year, as reflected in the books of 
accounts maintained by the Accountant General.  
GRF created vide 
notification dated 
September 15, 2009 
Bihar Bihar FRBM Act, 
2006 
No stipulation relating to guarantees in the Act. GRF not yet set up 
Chhattisgarh Chhattisgarh FRBM 
Act, 2006 
Outstanding guarantees at the end of the year should not 
exceed 1.5 per cent of GSDP. 
GRF not yet set up 
Goa The Goa State 
Guarantees Act, 1993 
The Government should cap the total outstanding guarantees 
within the specified limit under the Goa State Guarantees 
Act, 1993. The Goa legislature had fixed a limit of ` 800 
crore on the outstanding guarantees in March 2005. 
Set up GRF during 
2003-04 
Gujarat The Gujarat Sate 
Guarantees Act, 1963 
The Government should cap the total outstanding 
guarantees within the limit provided in the Gujarat Sate 
Guarantees Act, 1963. The State legislature decides such 
limits from time to time. With effect from March 2001, the 
limit for the total outstanding guarantees is  ` 20,000 crore 
Set up GRF in 1963 
Haryana Haryana FRBM Act, 
2005 
Does not contain any provisions for limiting the guarantees 
given by the State Government. 
GRF set up in July 
2003 
Himachal 
Pradesh 
Himachal Pradesh 
FRBM Act, 2005 
The total outstanding guarantees should be limited to 40 
per cent of revenue receipts for the year preceding the 
current year.  
GRF not yet set up 
Jammu and 
Kashmir 
Jammu & Kashmir 
FRBM Act, 2006 
 
The Act limits the amount of annual incremental risk 
weighted guarantees to 75 per cent of the total revenue 
receipts in the year preceding the current year or at 7.5 per 
cent of GSDP of the year preceding the current year, 
whichever is lower.   
GRF set up vide 
order dated August 
22, 2006 
Jharkhand Jharkhand FRBM Act 
2007 
No guarantee policy has been framed. GRF not yet set up  
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Karnataka The Karnataka 
Ceiling to 
Government 
Guarantees Act, 1999 
The Karnataka Fiscal 
Responsibility Act, 
2002 
The Act prescribes that the total outstanding guarantees as 
on the April 1 of any year shall not exceed eighty per cent 
of the State's revenue receipts of the second preceding year 
as in the books of the Accountant General of Karnataka.  
Under the Act, the state government is required not to give 
guarantee for any amount exceeding the limit stipulated 
under the Karnataka Ceiling to Government Guarantees 
Act, 1999 
The State 
Government had set 
up a ‘Guarantee 
Reserve Fund’ 
during 1999-2000. 
However, it is yet to 
constitute a GRF.  
Kerala The Kerala Ceiling 
on Government 
Guarantees Act, 2003 
Under the Act, the Government guarantees as on the 1st day 
of April of any year shall not exceed ` 14,000 crore. 
GRF not yet set up  
Madhya 
Pradesh 
Madhya Pradesh 
FRBM Act, 2005 
The State Government shall limit the annual incremental 
guarantees so as to ensure that the total guarantees do not 
exceed 80 per cent of the total revenue receipts in the year 
preceding the current year.  
GRF set up in 
January 2006 
Maharashtra Maharashtra FRBM 
Act, 2005  
The Act does not contain any provision for limiting the 
guarantees given by the State Government.  
GRF not yet set up  
Manipur The Manipur Ceiling 
on State Government 
Guarantees Act, 2004 
Under the Act, the total outstanding Government 
Guarantees as on the first day of April of any year shall not 
exceed thrice the State’s Own Tax revenue receipts of the 
second preceding year as they stood in the books of the 
Accountant General of Manipur. 
GRF set up in 2008-
09 
Meghalaya Meghalaya FRBM 
Act, 2006 
There is no statutory limit as to the outstanding amount of 
contingent liabilities. However, the State is committed to 
restricting the issue of guarantees.  
GRF set up in 2014-
15 
Mizoram The Mizoram Ceiling 
on Government 
Guarantees Act, 2011  
The total outstanding government guarantees as on the first 
day of April of any year shall not exceed 25 per cent of the 
GSDP estimated for the year and fresh guarantees given in 
a year shall not exceed 3 per cent of GSDP estimated for 
the year.  
GRF set up in May 
2009 
Nagaland Nagaland FRBM Act, 
2005 
The Act limits the amount of annual incremental risk 
weighted guarantees to 1 per cent of total revenue receipts 
or 1 per cent of the estimated GSDP in the year preceding 
the current year, whichever is lower. The exercise on risk-
weighting of the guarantees not yet done. 
GRF set up in 2006-
07 
Odisha Administrative 
ceiling on guarantees 
fixed in November 
2002 
In terms of the administrative ceiling, the total outstanding 
guarantees as on 1st day of April every year shall not 
exceed 100 per cent of the State’s revenue receipts of the 
second preceding year as reflected in the books of accounts 
maintained by the Accountant General. Attempt should be 
made to bring this gradually to the level of 80 per cent over 
the next five years. 
GRF set up in 2002-
03, which replaced 
the Guarantee 
Reserve Fund 
introduced as far 
back as in 1969 
Punjab Punjab FRBM Act, 
2003 
The Act capa outstanding guarantees on long-term debt to 
80 per cent of revenue receipts of the previous year; 
guarantees on short-term debt to be given only for working 
capital or food credit in which case this must be fully 
backed by physical stocks. 
GRF set up in 
December 2007 
(revised on January 
8, 2014 with effect 
from the Financial 
year 2012-13) 
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Rajasthan Administrative 
ceiling (1999) 
 
Rajasthan FRBM 
Act, 2005 
The total of loans and Government guarantee as on the last 
day of any financial year shall not exceed twice the 
estimated receipts in the Consolidated Fund of the State for 
that financial year. 
No separate guidelines relating to guarantees framed under 
the Rajasthan FRBM Act, 2005. However, there is a 
provision that total outstanding debt, excluding public 
account, and risk weighted outstanding guarantees in a year 
shall not exceed twice of the estimated receipts in the 
Consolidated Fund of the State at the close of the financial 
year.  
GRF set up in 1999-
2000 
Sikkim The Sikkim Ceiling 
on Government 
Guarantees Act, 2000 
The total outstanding government guarantees as on the first 
day of April of any year shall not exceed thrice the State’s 
tax revenue receipts of the second preceding year as in the 
books of Accountant General of Sikkim.  
GRF set up in 2005 
Tamil Nadu Tamil Nadu Fiscal 
Responsibility Act, 
2003 
The Act caps total outstanding guarantees to 100 per cent 
of the total revenue receipts of the preceding year or at 10 
per cent of GSDP, whichever is lower and caps risk 
weighted guarantees to 75 per cent of total revenue receipts 
of the preceding year and 7.5 per cent of GSDP, whichever 
is lower. 
GRF set up in 
March 2003 
Telangana Telangana FRBM 
Act, 2005 
Under the Act, the amount of annual incremental risk 
weighted guarantees is limited to 90 per cent of the total 
revenue receipts in the year preceding the current year. 
GRF set up by the 
composite state of 
Andhra Pradesh in 
2002-03. Telangana 
yet to frame fresh 
guidelines for GRF. 
Tripura Tripura FRBM Act, 
2005 
The Act limits the amount of annual incremental risk 
weighted guarantees to 1.0 per cent of GSDP of that year. 
GRF set up on July 
2007 
Uttar Pradesh Uttar Pradesh FRBM 
Act, 2004 
The State Government shall not give guarantee for any 
amount exceeding the limit stipulated under any rule or law 
of the State Government existing at the time of coming into 
force of this Act or any rule or law to be made by the State 
Government subsequent to coming into force of this Act. 
However, the State has not enacted any law or framed any 
rules for fixing the ceiling on guarantees to be given by the 
State Government. 
GRF not yet set up 
Uttarakhand Uttarakhand FRBM 
Act, 2005 
Not to give guarantee for any amount exceeding the limit 
stipulated under any rule or law of the State Government 
existing at the time of coming into force of this Act or any 
rule or law to be made by the State Government 
subsequent to coming into force of this Act. 
GRF  set up in 
2006-07 
West Bengal The West Bengal 
Ceiling on 
Government 
Guarantees Act, 2001 
The total outstanding Government Guarantees as on first 
day of April of any year shall not exceed 90 per cent of the 
State revenue receipts of the second preceding year as in 
the books of Accountant General of the State Government. 
GRF set up vide 
notification dated 
January 2, 2015 
Notes: *: Refers to the original Act. These Acts/legislations have been amended from time to time. 
**: GRF is to be utilised for meeting the payment obligations arising out of the guarantees issued by the state government in 
respect of bonds issued and other borrowings by the state level undertakings or other bodies and invoked by the 
‘beneficiaries’. 
Source: FRBM Acts of respective state governments and Comptroller and Auditor General of India. 
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Appendix IV : Outstanding Liabilities and Guarantees of State Governments (at end-March 
2015) 
 
(Amount in ` crore) 
State Outstanding 
Liabilities* 
Guarantees Outstanding 3 as % 
of 2 
4 as % 
of 3 
Total Power sector 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Andhra Pradesh 115265.9** 10675.3 8585.8 9.3 80.4 
Assam 35403.2 143.1 56.3 0.4 39.3 
Arunachal 
Pradesh 
6121.7 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Bihar 99055.8 2148.7 770.6 2.2 35.9 
Chhattisgarh 31181.0 2314.5 714.9 7.4 30.9 
Gujarat 202313.4 5983.8 1077.1 3.0 18.0 
Haryana 88446.1 30387.7 28354.2 34.4 93.3 
Himachal Pradesh 38191.8 4281.3 2454.6 11.2 57.3 
Jammu and 
Kashmir 
48303.5 2858.0 2706.2 5.9 94.7 
Jharkhand 43569.1 157.2 157.2 0.4 100.0 
Karnataka 158552.9 11032.8 265.4 7.0 2.4 
Kerala 141946.9 11126.9 37.1 7.8 0.3 
Madhya Pradesh 108026.4 20124.3 5936.3 18.6 29.5 
Maharashtra 319745.9 7999.5 694.1 2.5 8.7 
Manipur 7357.4 193.0 0.0 2.6 0.0 
Meghalaya 6751.5 1173.8 1091.0 17.4 92.9 
Mizoram 6550.4 96.9 0.0 1.5 0.0 
Nagaland 7953.7 70.2 0.0 0.9 0.0 
Odisha 50493.3 1671.8 1551.0 3.3 92.8 
Punjab 112365.9 66893.3 14032.9 59.5 21.0 
Rajasthan 147608.5 94577.8 86979.5 64.1 92.0 
Sikkim 3481.4 112.1 0.0 3.2 0.0 
Tamil Nadu 191847.0 53697.6 51939.6 28.0 96.7 
Telangana 79880.1 18265.2 13587.8 22.9 74.4 
Tripura 9319.6 241.5 121.9 2.6 50.5 
Uttar Pradesh 290373.3*** 70739.6 67530.9 24.4 95.5 
Uttarakhand 33480.3 1831.9 1223.8 5.5 66.8 
West Bengal 277579.2 9386.0 3398.7 3.4 36.2 
All States 2661165.0 428184.5 293266.6 16.1 68.5 
Notes: 
 *: Includes public debt and other liabilities 
**: This does not include ` 33477.52 crore of liabilities (largely under public account), which is yet to be apportioned 
between  Andhra Pradesh and Telangana.  The same holds for outstanding liabilities of Telangana. 
***: This does not include an amount of 17,485.4 crore as on November 8, 2000, which is yet to be apportioned between 
Uttar Pradesh and Uttarakhand. 
Source: Comptroller and Auditor General of India. 
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Appendix V: Ujwal Discom Assurance Yojana 
 
State Date of 
signing 
MoU 
Amount 
Outstanding 
(CPSUs/State 
Government/Ba
nks (`. Crore) 
Restructuring Process 
Andhra Pradesh June 24, 
2016 
14720.5 50% of outstanding debt to be 
taken over by September 30 and 
25% by March 31, 2016 
Assam January 4, 
2017 
1510 75% of outstanding debt to be 
taken over 
Bihar    
North Bihar February 22, 
2016 
1282.5 50% of outstanding debt to be 
taken over in 2015-16 and 25% 
in 2016-17 
South Bihar February 22, 
2016 
1826.5 50% of outstanding debt to be 
taken over in 2015-16 and 25% 
in 2016-17 
Chhattisgarh January 25,  
2016 
1740.2 50% of outstanding debt to be 
taken over in 2015-16 and 25% 
in 2016-17 
Goa June 16, 
2016 
 Improve operational parameters 
Gujarat Feb 13, 2016  Improve operational and 
financial efficiency 
Haryana March 11,  
2016 
34600.0 50% of outstanding debt to be 
taken over in 2015-16 and 25% 
in 2016-17 
Himachal 
Pradesh 
December 8, 
2016 
3854.0 75% of outstanding debt to be 
taken over in 2016-17 
Jammu & 
Kashmir 
March 15,  
2016 
3537.6 100% of the provisional 
outstanding dues of various 
CPSUs as on September 30, 
2015 to be taken over during 
2015-16 or 2016-17 
Jharkhand January 5, 
 2016 
7165.4 50% of outstanding debt to be 
taken over in 2015-16 and 25% 
in 2016-17 
Karnataka June 16, 
 2016 
 Improve operational efficiency 
Madhya Pradesh August 10,  
2016 
34739.0 75% of outstanding debt to be 
taken over in 5 years. 
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Maharashtra October 7,  
2016 
22097.0 75% of outstanding debt to be 
taken over in 5 years. 
Manipur July 26, 
 2016 
 Improve operational efficiency 
Punjab March 4,  
2016 
20837.7 50% of outstanding debt to be 
taken over in 2015-16 and 25% 
in 2016-17 
Puducherry August 10,  
2016 
 Improve operational parameters 
Rajasthan    
Ajmer January 27,  
2016 
26597.0 50% of outstanding debt to be 
taken over in 2015-16 and 25% 
in 2016-17 
Jaipur January 27,  
2016 
28056.0 50% of outstanding debt to be 
taken over in 2015-16 and 25% 
in 2016-17 
Jodhpur January 27, 
 2016 
25877.0 50% of outstanding debt to be 
taken over in 2015-16 and 25% 
in 2016-17 
Tamil Nadu January 9, 
2017 
30420.0 75% of outstanding debt as on 
September 30, 2015  to be taken 
over 
Telangana January 4, 
2017 
11897.0 75% of outstanding debt as on 
September 30, 2015  to be taken 
over 
Uttar Pradesh January 30,  
2016 
53211.0 50% of outstanding debt to be 
taken over in 2015-16 and 25% 
in 2016-17 
Uttarakhand March 31,  
2016 
 Improve operational efficiency 
  Source: Ministry of Power. 
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Appendix VI: Outstanding Liabilities of State Governments and State PSUs   
(at end-March 2015) 
(Per cent to GSDP/GDP) 
State Outstanding Liabilities 
State Governments State PSUs 
1 2 3 
Andhra Pradesh 22.2 10.2 
Arunachal Pradesh 39.3 NA 
Assam 19.3 1.5 
Bihar 24.6 2.9 
Chhattisgarh 14.8 6.5 
Gujarat 22.6 4.7 
Haryana 20.3 8.7 
Himachal Pradesh 37.8 6.5 
Jammu and Kashmir 54.9 5.0 
Jharkhand 22.1 3.9 
Karnataka 22.6 4.6 
Kerala 31.3 2.0 
Madhya Pradesh 21.3 7.3 
Maharashtra 19.0 3.2 
Manipur 44.2 0.0 
Meghalaya 26.7 5.2 
Mizoram 54.2 0.3 
Nagaland 39.6 0.3 
Odisha 16.2 2.4 
Punjab 32.1 4.2 
Rajasthan 25.7 13.0 
Sikkim 23.9 1.9 
Tamil Nadu 19.6 6.4 
Telangana 18.6 11.8 
Tripura 30.4 0.8 
Uttar Pradesh 29.7 9.1 
Uttarakhand 24.1 NA 
West Bengal 34.7 2.9 
All States 21.2 5.1 
Source: Comptroller and Auditor General of India and authors calculation. 
 
 
 
 
